Beyond Collusion Resistance: Leveraging Social Information for Plural Funding and Voting
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https://gyazo.com/2c215b2d8a86ac2ddcefc9793e0f9f2b
In its 2018 introduction and subsequent work, Quadratic Funding (QF) emerged as a uniquely optimal design for the democratic provision of public goods under the assumption of atomized participants with perfect rationality. In this paper, we aim to move past this rational and atomized portrayal of human beings and explore pluralistic QF mechanisms that recognize the influence of social connections among participants and incentivize cooperation across social differences. With this goal in mind, we define collusion resistance as a criterion against disproportional power accumulation in Quadratic Funding models that can arise from pre-existing participant relationships and argue that collusion resistant QF and plural QF are two sides of the same coin. Next, we evaluate various iterations of Quadratic Funding, testing their collusion resistance and other social and technical issues. Finally, we propose several new mechanisms, including Connection-Oriented Cluster Match, which satisfies our definition of collusion resistance. Our findings show great potential for making Quadratic Funding more pluralistic. They might also guide principles and practices of computational design that bridge the epistemological divides between classical economics and social reality.
ChatGPT.iconQuadratic Funding (QF) is a mechanism for providing public goods in a democratic way. It has traditionally been designed for atomized, rational participants, but this paper aims to explore variations of QF that take into account the influence of social connections and incentivize cooperation across social differences. The authors define "collusion resistance" as a criterion for preventing the disproportionate accumulation of power in QF models that may arise from pre-existing participant relationships, and argue that collusion resistant QF and "plural" QF are two sides of the same coin. The authors then evaluate various versions of QF, testing their collusion resistance and other social and technical issues. They propose several new mechanisms, including the "Connection Oriented Cluster Match," which they claim satisfies their definition of collusion resistance. The authors conclude that their findings have the potential to make QF more pluralistic and could provide principles and practices for computational design that bridge the gap between classical economics and social reality. 上で過去に書いたメモもだいぶ忘れた。
https://gyazo.com/069a00488b00ec91988870111609a473
Figure 1 also illustrates how the total amount of funding awarded by QF is made up partly of the contributions of individual agents and partly of an extra matching subsidy awarded by the system from an external fund.
https://gyazo.com/8b834c380615971e37a9bb7c0182aa79
https://gyazo.com/09cc41ed1656fea945a10c0cde8feb28
これは全部8ドルの寄付だけど、それぞれ「8人が1ドルづつ寄付した場合」「2人ずつ4ドル寄付した場合」「1人が8ドルを寄付した場合」を表している
つまり、この正方形の大きさが最終的にプロジェクトが受け取れる金額
社会的距離をベースとしたQFでの分配方法（投票力をどう調節するか）はいろんな方法がある https://gyazo.com/bbf4e7458a30b1c8cd8e5b14fad7e9eb
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